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Summary
The 2001 tax revision began a phaseout of the estate tax, by increasing
exemptions and lowering rates.  The estate tax is scheduled to be repealed in 2010
and a provision to tax appreciation on inherited assets (in excess of a limit) will be
substituted.  The 2001 tax provisions sunset, however, so that absent a change
making them permanent the estate tax will revert, in 2011, to prior, pre-2001, law.
Currently, discussions of the estate tax are focusing particular attention on the
effects on family businesses, including farms, and perception that the estate tax
unfairly burdens family businesses because much of the estate value is held in illiquid
assets, e.g., land, buildings, and equipment.  The estate tax may even force the
liquidation of family businesses.  A special family business deduction, the Qualified
Family Owned Business Interest Exemption (QFOBI) was enacted in 1997. Presently,
because of higher exemptions allowed and a previous cap on the combined regular
and small business exemption, this provision is no longer relevant.  If, however, the
estate tax repeal sunsets, QFOBI will again be germane.  H.R. 8, which would make
the estate tax repeal permanent, has been passed by the House, but not by the Senate.
There are also proposals to allow an expanded business exemption (H.R. 1612 and
S. 928) as well as proposals to allow a higher exemption (H.R. 1577 and H.R. 1574)
or both a higher exemption and lower rate (H.R. 1560, H.R. 1568, and H.R. 1614).
Evidence suggests, however, that only a small fraction of estates with small or
family business interests have paid the estate tax (about 3.5% for businesses in
general, and 5% for farmers, compared to 2% for all estates).  Recent estimates
suggest that only a tiny fraction of family owned businesses (less than ½ of 1%) are
subject to the estate tax but do not have readily available resources to pay the tax.
Thus, while the estate tax may be a burden on those families, the problem is confined
to a small group.
If the estate tax is repealed, QFOBI will allow an exemption for some or all of
business assets in about a third to a half of estates with more than half their assets in
these businesses, but the value of the exemption will be reduced because the general
exemption has increased.  If the estate tax repeal is made permanent, liquidity will
cease being a problem, although family businesses may be more likely than other
estates to be affected by the capital gains provisions.  Exposure to the estate tax, if
it is reinstated, would be significantly decreased by increases in either the family
business or general exemptions.  The report also discusses an uncapped exemption
and an uncapped exemption targeted at liquidity issues. 
 
This report will be updated as legislative events warrant.
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1 For a discussion of the political issues surrounding the estate tax issue, including the issue
of family businesses, see Michael J. Graetz and Ian Shapiro, Death by a Thousand Cuts: The
Fight over Taxing Inherited Wealth, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005). 
2 Non-business assets, such as cash, bonds, and publicly traded stock, are all relatively liquid
assets.  Under current estate tax rules, the basis of these assets is stepped up to the value at
the time of death, thus eliminating the potential for capital gains taxes on inherited
appreciation after liquidation.
Estate Taxes and Family Businesses:
Economic Issues
The Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (EGTRRA)
phased out the estate tax by gradually increasing the exemption and lowering the rate;
the tax will be eliminated in 2010.  A provision providing for carryover basis for
assets transferred at death will replace the current step-up in basis.  This latter
provision would require heirs, when selling inherited assets, to pay tax on the gain
that existed at the time of death, in addition to any appreciation since transfer.  (A
$1.3 million exemption would be allowed, with an additional $3 million for a
surviving spouse.)  The repeal of the estate tax and the provision for carryover basis
is  sunsetted and, absent legislative change, will revert to pre-2001 law in 2011, with
an exemption of $1 million and a top statutory tax rate of 55%.  The law will also
revert to the prior rule of a stepped-up basis for assets, where no capital gains tax
would be paid on appreciation of assets existing at the time of death.    
Currently, discussions about the estate tax are focusing particular attention on
the effects on family businesses, including farms.1  Many policy makers and
observers have maintained that the estate tax unfairly burdens family businesses
because much of the estate value is held in illiquid assets, e.g., land, buildings, and
equipment.2  The estate tax, it is suggested, forces these businesses to liquidate vital
assets to pay the tax.  Critics of the estate tax posit that, in some cases, liquidating the
business completely may be the only option.  
Prior law contained a special deduction for family-owned businesses (the
qualified family-owned business interest deduction, or QFOBI) to address this issue;
this deduction was capped so that the total of the normal exemption and the family
business exemption could not exceed $1.3 million.  The deduction was also
contingent on meeting a number of qualifying rules.  QFOBI is currently irrelevant
since the exemption is $1.5 million (and was repealed by EGTRRA for 2004 and
beyond), but will play a role again if the EGTRRA provisions sunset.  The estate tax
(both under current and permanent rules) contains some other provisions that may
make the payment of the tax easier for family-owned businesses.  Qualifying estates
can pay the tax in installments over a maximum of 10 years after a five-year deferral,
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3 Some of the deferred tax is subject to a 2% interest payment.  The provision allowing
current use valuation requires a recapture tax, unless heirs continue to use the land in the
business for at least 10 years. The market value can be reduced by a maximum of $750,000
through 1998. After 1998, the maximum is indexed for inflation, rounded to the next lowest
multiple of $10,000. In 2004, the maximum was $850,000.
4 The idea behind the minority discount is that heirs without control are constrained in the
flow of income, and the possibility of sale.  There are other related discounts, such as
marketability discounts (because no ready market exists for the asset).  There are concerns
that these discounts are excessive in some cases and that they are used through estate
planning to minimize estate taxes, and the Joint Tax Committee, in its study Options to
Improve Tax Compliance and Reform Tax Expenditures, January 27, 2005, has proposed
some revisions (see pp. 396-404).  
5 See CRS Report RL32768, Estate and Gift Tax Revenues: Several Measures, by Nonna
Noto. 
6 See CRS Report RL32818, Estate Tax Legislation in the 109th Congress, by Nonna Noto.
and can value their land as currently used rather than at fair market value.3   Family
owned business may also be more likely to benefit from minority and marketability
discounts, which allow a lower valuation if the property is held by several heirs with
a minority interest or is otherwise difficult to sell.4    
Proposals have been made to make the 2010 provision permanent, and
legislation to that effect, H.R. 8, has passed the House.  Making the change
permanent would involve a significant revenue loss, in excess of $50 billion in 2012.5
There are also proposals to retain the estate tax but allow an expanded business
exemption (H.R. 1612 and S. 928), a higher exemption (H.R. 1577 and H.R. 1574),
or both a higher exemption and lower rate (H.R. 1560, H.R. 1568, and H.R. 1614).6
This report discusses the general issue of family-owned businesses, and then
discusses the consequences of several options including making no revisions (and
hence returning to pre-2001 law in 2011); making the repeal of the estate tax
permanent; and, modifying exemptions while retaining an estate tax.  This latter
discussion considers expanding or altering the existing general or business
exemptions, providing an exemption for all business assets (no dollar ceiling or other
restrictions), or modifying the QFOBI-type exemption to eliminate a cliff effect that
currently exists because only estates with half of the assets in a business were eligible
for the special deduction.  
Family Business Assets in the Estate Tax Base
Although much attention has been devoted to the effect of the estate tax on
family farms and businesses, and in particular the forced liquidation of family
businesses and business assets, very few family businesses pay the estate tax and very
little of the estate tax is collected from family businesses (and none from truly small
businesses due to the exemption levels).  Of those estates with family business assets,
most would appear to be able to pay the tax, as discussed below. 
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7 See CRS Report RS20593, Asset Distribution of Taxable Estates, by Steven Maguire.
8  CRS Report RL30600, Estate and Gift Taxes: Economic Issues, by Jane G.  Gravelle and
Steven Maguire.
Farm and business assets appear to account for around 11-12% of taxable estate
assets, and perhaps a little more because these data are from 2003 when some QFOBI
still existed.7  
Some data reported in another CRS report8  are instructive regarding the ability
of family-owned businesses to pay the tax.  Of taxable estates in 2003, 6.4% reported
farm assets and 36.0% reported business assets.  However, while around 40.0% of
taxable estate tax returns report some business or farm assets (there is some overlap
between the farm and business numbers), only 1.4 % of estates were those where
farm assets were at least half the estate and only 1.6% of estates had business assets
that accounted for half the estate. Farm assets in these returns accounted for 0.6% of
estate value and business assets 4.1%.  Since estates with less than half their assets
in farm or business assets would have other sources (from the estate itself) to pay the
tax, only this small fraction of estates would presumably have to deal with possible
liquidation, and these estates were targeted by QFOBI.  Table 1 and Table 2 below
report the percentage of estates with business assets by estate size and the value of
the business assets as a percentage of the estate by estate size for returns filed in
2003, respectively.
Table 1.  Percentage of Estates with Business Assets by Type of



















All Returns 66,043 3.8% 14.4% 6.4% 12.0% 9.6%
1 to 2.5 million 49,748 2.5% 11.0% 6.4% 9.2% 7.3%
2.5 to 5.0 million 10,549 5.3% 20.1% 6.4% 16.2% 12.8%
5.0 to 10.0 million 3,732 9.5% 28.1% 6.6% 24.2% 19.0%
10.0 to 20 million 1,293 16.8% 37.5% 7.5% 34.3% 27.8%
over 20.0 million 721 20.8% 50.6% 10.8% 44.4% 36.8%
Taxable Returns 30,626 3.4% 11.4% 6.4% 13.0% 8.3%
1 to 2.5 million 21,635 2.2% 7.6% 6.1% 10.7% 6.0%
2.5 to 5.0 million 5,505 3.6% 15.1% 7.1% 13.4% 10.4%
5.0 to 10.0 million 2,157 7.6% 22.4% 6.4% 20.7% 15.3%
10.0 to 20 million 824 13.8% 33.3% 7.9% 30.3% 22.3%
over 20.0 million 505 17.8% 46.1% 12.1% 41.8% 34.1%
Source:  Internal Revenue Service, Statistics of Income, Estate Tax Returns Filed in 2003, IRS, SOI
unpublished data, October 2004.
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This same report also estimated that only 3.3% of business owners face the
estate tax, and about 5% of farmers do.  This share is slightly larger than the share of
all decedents, where less than 2% pay the tax, reflecting the higher average wealth
of the farm and business owners.
Table 2.  Percentage of Estate Value Held in Business Assets by






















All Returns 194,555,081 1.32% 5.39% 0.44% 1.99% 1.59%
1 to 2.5 million 74,007,063 0.53% 2.34% 0.58% 0.52% 0.62%
2.5 to 5.0 million 35,954,444 0.97% 3.95% 0.44% 1.37% 1.08%
5.0 to 10.0 million 25,285,191 1.18% 5.47% 0.40% 2.28% 1.60%
10.0 to 20 million 17,645,262 2.08% 7.83% 0.39% 2.66% 1.65%
over 20.0 million 41,663,121 2.78% 10.96% 0.23% 4.68% 3.73%
Taxable Returns 109,867,168 1.30% 4.84% 0.30% 2.02% 1.47%
1 to 2.5 million 33,754,841 0.56% 1.37% 0.36% 0.54% 0.36%
2.5 to 5.0 million 18,875,602 0.67% 2.71% 0.35% 1.29% 0.57%
5.0 to 10.0 million 14,684,938 0.72% 3.79% 0.18% 2.10% 1.37%
10.0 to 20 million 11,218,994 1.79% 6.51% 0.27% 2.05% 1.00%
over 20.0 million 31,332,793 2.57% 9.77% 0.26% 4.00% 3.41%
Source:  Internal Revenue Service, Statistics of Income, Estate Tax Returns Filed in 2003, IRS, SOI
unpublished data, October 2004.
If one considers the ability to pay the tax out of all non-business assets, then if
half the estate is held in other assets, given a tax rate of 55%,  and since assets are
excluded from the estate through general exemptions as well, the non-business assets
would generally be adequate to pay the tax (since the tax as a share of the estate will
usually be below 50% of the value).  According to the data reported above, about
20% of returns with farm assets (1.4/6.4) have more than 50% of assets in farm
assets, suggesting that less than 1% of decedents with farm assets would not have
enough non-business resources to pay the tax.  For business owners, only about 4%
involve returns where business assets are more than one half the estate.  Thus, by this
calculation, less than 1/10 of 1% of business owners would not have enough non-
business resources to pay the tax.  
 Evidence suggests that most of these estates could still pay the estate tax out of
liquid assets alone (cash, bonds, and publicly traded stock) under pre-2001 law, and
thus would not have to cash in any other property (such as a home or other real
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9 Congressional Budget Office, Effects of the Federal Estate Tax on Farms and Small
Businesses, July 2005.  
10  Minority discounts ranged from an average of 16% for residential real estate to 51% for
undeveloped land or farmland.
estate).   A recent study by the Congressional Budget Office,9 hereafter the CBO
study, examined data from 2000 to determine the fraction of estates that would not
have enough liquid assets (stocks, bonds, cash, etc) to pay the tax.  (They also
indicated that liquid assets would be somewhat higher because it was not able to
include assets held in trusts in this study.)  For farms, it found that, in 2000, 8% of
farm estates could not pay the tax out of liquid assets.  Given that an estimated 5%
of farm estates pay the tax, less than one half of one percent of farm decedents would
be faced with selling any non-liquid assets (whether business or other) to pay the
estate tax.  
The CBO study did not examine business owners broadly, since it restricted its
examination to those business returns that were eligible for QFOBI, and which,
therefore, by definition, have estates where business assets account for over half of
the estate.  These estates are thus much less likely than the average business owner
to have sufficient liquid assets to pay the estate tax.  But even among these estates,
only 32% did not have sufficient liquid assets to pay the estate tax.  Thus, it seems
likely that the shares of businesses overall that could not pay the tax out of liquid
assets are similar in magnitude, and probably smaller, than farms. 
These estimates suggest that only a tiny fraction of family owned businesses
(less than ½ of 1%) do not have enough readily available resources to pay the estate
tax.  Thus, while the estate tax may be a burden on those families, the problem is
confined to a small group.  In addition, businesses that do not have other assets
sufficient to pay the tax still have the option of paying in installments, borrowing, or
selling a partial interest in the business.  On average these businesses also received
significant minority discounts, so that the estate tax owed would be smaller relative
to the value of the property.10    
Policy Options for Addressing Family Business
Issues
There are several alternative policy options for  addressing family business
estate tax issues.  If EGTRRA sunsets, the QFOBI deduction will once again become
relevant:  the first section below discusses general issues surrounding this provision.
The following section discusses the implications for family businesses of making the
estate tax repeal permanent.  The remaining sections address various revisions within
the framework of retaining an estate tax, including an increase in either the QFOBI
or general exemption, an unlimited business assets deduction, and an alternative
business deduction that would target illiquidity but address a problem with QFOBI
due to a “cliff” effect.
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11 The estate tax actually has graduated rates, but the exemption is effectively a credit, which
means that the first dollar taxed is taxed at a rate in the middle of the tax schedule, rather
than at the beginning as in the income tax.  The first taxable dollar is effectively taxed at
41%, the rates rise to 55%, and there is also a 5% surcharge applying for estates between
$10 million and $17.84 million to eliminate the advantages of the lower rate and exemption
so that estates above this top limit are taxed at an average rate of 55%.
12   Graetz and Shapiro, p. 36.
Permanent Effects of the Current Law (No Legislative Change
and a Reversion to Pre-2001 Law in 2011) 
If no legislative action is taken, the estate tax exemption will rise through 2009
(to $3.5 million) and the rate will fall to 45%.  In 2010, the estate tax will be
repealed, but in 2011 the rules will revert to those that existed before EGTRRA.
Under these rules, which were last revised in 1997, the general estate tax exemption
will be $1 million, the tax rate will be 55%,11 and a QFOBI exemption will be
allowed, but the combined exemption will still be limited to $1.3 million.  Thus, the
effective QFOBI exemption is capped at $300,000. 
Returning to the status quo and QFOBI raises several issues, a key one being
that the real value of the cap has fallen compared to pre-2001 law, so more qualifying
estates will be subject to tax.  Thus, it might be appropriate to increase the overall
cap.
The QFOBI provisions are subject to a number of restrictions designed to ensure
that the business is family owned (the decedent and decedent’s family must own 50%
of the business, or own 30% of a business that is 70% owned by two families, or 90%
owned by three families).   The business cannot have been publicly traded in the last
three years, no more than 35% of the business income may be personal holding
company income, and the business must have been owned and operated for five of
the past eight years.  Heirs are required to continue the business for the next 10 years
to avoid recapture.  Finally, QFOBI applies only to estates where at least 50% of the
assets are family business assets.  There are also restrictions on the amount of
working capital which are designed to prevent the movement of cash and other liquid
assets into the business to increase the deduction or allow an estate to qualify.   
The rules designed to target the QFOBI provisions have been criticized due to
their complexity.  For example, Michael Graetz and Ian Shapiro write:
Everyone now agrees — regardless of which side of the issue they are on — that
QFOBI has been a complete and utter failure... It did not solve anything.  QFOBI
has so many requirements, so many structures and pitfalls, that very few family
businesses have obtained any tax relief at all because of it.12     
This is a harsh criticism, and it is not necessarily supported by the data.
According to the CBO study, for 2000, about 1% of taxable returns claimed the
QFOBI and about 1.4% of estates filing returns did so.  Given the evidence that only
about 3% of taxable estates had more than half of assets in business (and recognizing
that some of these estates become nontaxable because of QFOBI), it appears that
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about a third to a half of these businesses qualified for QFOBI.  QFOBI’s scope was
limited primarily because it was allowed only for those estates where a majority of
assets were in the business.  Other estates with more than half of their assets in
business assets might not have qualified because the business assets were not fully
a family business (i.e. largely owned by no more than three families), or because the
heirs chose to sell the business.    
The QFOBI provision does, nevertheless, raise questions of equity and can
produce some economic distortions, as well as complications.  
The special business deduction does create some issues of equity — as is the
case with any type of special tax exemption.  Those with eligible business assets will
pay lower taxes on the same amount of wealth than those without such assets.  This
inequity is a necessary price of targeting a specific group, and must be weighed
against the benefits of the QFOBI targeted tax benefit generating a smaller revenue
loss than a broader exemption.    
QFOBI also creates economic distortions.  It induces taxpayers to shift assets
into business form, or, alternatively, to avoid liquidating a business when that
outcome would be most desirable.  How these incentives work depends, in part, on
the kind of exemption.  Consider an unlimited exemption for business assets.  For
taxable estates and a 55% estate tax rate, a dollar shifted from non-business assets to
business assets saves 55 cents.  Or, from another perspective, if business assets
earned the same return as other assets, one would be willing to pay $2.22 ($1/(1-
0.55)) for a business asset that normally sells for a dollar.  Or if asset prices are fixed,
one would be willing to accept a rate of return that was as much as 55% smaller in
a business investment than in other investments.
The QFOBI provision was limited to estates with 50% or more of gross estate
value in business assets, and was capped.  Thus, very large estates that had already
used up the cap would have no incentive to shift assets, as would estates with so few
business assets they would be unlikely to qualify.  However smaller estates that fell
below the cap and were eligible would have the same incentives as described above
for the unlimited simple exemptions (each dollar shifted would, with a 55% tax rate,
save 55 cents).  And estates that were very close to eligibility would have powerful
incentives to shift business investments, though a “cliff’ effect.  To use a simple
example, from pre-2001 law (a $675,000 regular exemption and a maximum of $1.3
million with the business deduction, but using a flat rate for illustrative purposes), if
business assets were 45% and the  estate totaled $3 million, by shifting $150,000 in
assets from non-business to business would save $343,750 (0.55 times $625,000).
Even if the assets were virtually worthless, as long as they were not shifted for a long
time (causing forgone earnings), one would be better off making the investment. 
Cliffs are generally to be avoided in devising minimally distorting tax rules.
        
A third response to this cliff effect would be to overvalue business assets; these
rules also magnify existing incentives to undervalue other assets.  This response does
not distort investment but it does use up resources in estate planning and causes
unintended benefits and revenue losses.  The cliff effect can also intensify the
existing incentives to remove non-business assets from the estate.  All of the special
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business deduction provisions create incentives to recharacterize as much of the
estate as possible as business assets.  
  The provision of QFOBI that required keeping the business in the family after
the decedent’s death (that recaptured all or part of the tax when the business was
ended) also produces economic distortions.  The provision affects the allocation of
capital and the employment of the heirs.  This rule, of course, was intended to target
those family businesses whose failure to continue was due to the estate tax.
Finally, the QFOBI provisions complicate administration and compliance.  For
example, there  are rules to prevent holding of cash and other liquid assets in the
business; since all businesses must have some cash or near-cash assets available, it
is necessary to determine what level of working capital is needed in the business.
Such a provision would be necessary with any form of business exemption, since
without such rules non-business assets could be lodged in the business. There are also
provisions to deal with ownership and control by the family, and whether someone
has materially participated in the business. 
 From this analysis, it seems clear that QFOBI went a long way towards
achieving its objective, but it does reflect problems that arose as a result of the
targeting of the provision.  These problems do not mean that QFOBI was not
desirable, as it reflects a specific trade-off of the benefits of addressing the liquidity
problem at a minimal revenue cost against the efficiency, equity, and administrative
costs.  The difficulties in qualifying for QFOBI were perhaps largely because the
provision was targeted at family-owned businesses that dominated the estate, not
estates that were less clearly “family-owned.”
Effect of Making Estate Tax Repeal Permanent 
If the estate tax repeal is made permanent, the liquidity issue will disappear for
years 2010 and after.  However, given that less than 3% of estates could encounter
a liquidity problem (returns with more than half of assets in the business, 1.4% for
farms and 1.6% for other businesses), this repeal would be very costly from the
federal budget perspective if the only objective were to deal with the family-owned
business issue.  
There is no liquidity problem with this tax regime, because there would be no
estate tax and the capital gains tax would apply only if the assets are sold.  
This new regime would, however, raise some different issues regarding the
effects on the family business.  Theoretically, under an income tax, “all accretions to
wealth” over a given period of time should be taxed.  Traditionally the U.S. income
tax has not imposed a tax on gain until realized, and has allowed stepped up basis for
appreciated assets so that no tax on the gain accumulated by the decedent is taxed on
sale by the heirs.  The estate tax provided a backstop to this exemption so that large
accumulations of gain would be taxed under the estate tax.  The Economic Growth
and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (EGTRRA)  addressed this issue through
changing the asset valuation to a “carry-over” basis regime when the estate tax is
repealed in 2010.  Under carry-over basis, the heir assumes the basis of the decedent.
In other words, the heir “steps into the shoes” of the decedent and would pay capital
CRS-9
13 This value is identified as the “cost-basis” of the asset.  Ordinarily it is the original
purchase price of the asset adjusted for improvements and depreciation in the case of
physical assets.
14 James M. Poterba and Scott Weisbenner, “The Distributional Burden of Taxing Estates
and Unrealized Capital Gains at the Time of Death,” National Bureau of Economic
Research, Working Paper No. 7811, (Cambridge, MA: NBER, July 2000), p. 36.
15 State estate and inheritance taxes vary by state.  Many states have “decoupled” from the
federal estate tax and levy stand alone estate and inheritance taxes.
16 Neil E. Harl, “Taxation of Capital Gains, Gains at Death, and Estates: Policy
Considerations,” Tax Notes, Special Report, July 4, 2005, p. 10.
17 This estimate is calculated by dividing $1.3 million by 35%.
gains taxes (upon sale of the asset) based on the appreciation from the original
purchase price (or value).13  Congress included in EGTRRA a $3 million spousal
exclusion and a $1.3 million general exclusion for capital gains on transferred assets
to reduce the tax burden on heirs who sell inherited assets. 
Family businesses, and small businesses more generally, likely have significant
unrealized capital gains when the proprietor dies.  One study estimated the amount
of unrealized capital gains held at death for estates valued under $5 million to be
approximately 35% of the estates’ value (approximately $34 billion in the aggregate
in 1998).14   Any business with total assets valued less than the exemption amount,
which is $1.5 million in 2005 rising to $3.5 million in 2009, would not pay any
federal estate taxes.15  In addition, the value of all assets in the business would be
stepped up to the value at the time of death.  Based on the above estimate of the
portion of estate value represented by untaxed capital gains, the step-up treatment
confers a significant tax benefit to these estates.  The estate tax regime with the
stepped-up basis on transferred assets clearly favors these relatively small business
estates, sheltering a total of approximately $34 billion in capital gains from taxation.
Some have noted that farms in particular benefit from this treatment because, among
other reasons, “...the income tax basis of raised animals, for farmers on the cash
method of accounting, is zero;....”16
When the estate tax is repealed in 2010, the stepped-up basis is replaced with
carry-over basis treatment (explained earlier).  Congress, however, included a safe
harbor for $1.3 million in capital gains passed to a non-spouse.  Using the 35%
unrealized capital gains estimate above, this treatment would, on average, shelter an
estate valued at approximately $3.7 million from capital gains tax liability (if heirs
sold bequeathed assets).17  The smaller the portion of unrealized capital gains, the
larger the overall estate size that could avoid capital gains taxation.  The difficulty
in assessing and confirming the decedent’s basis would create an incentive to
overstate basis to avoid capital gains taxes.
Theory suggests that the potential capital gains tax liability for the very large
estates may generate dynastic asset hoarding.  For the largest estates in the NBER
study cited above — those with assets over $10 million — the unrealized capital
gains comprised over 56% of the estate’s total value.  The unrealized gains are
predominantly business assets in these very large estates; 72.3% of the unrealized
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gain is held in active farm or business assets.  Over time, the potential tax liability
would likely increase along with unrealized capital gains further reducing the
probability of capital gain realization.
For family businesses that heirs wish to continue, the potential tax liability and
asset liquidity are not primary concerns under the carry-over basis regime.  In
contrast, for heirs who wish to liquidate the business, in particular business with
significant untaxed capital gains, the carry-over basis treatment may generate
significant tax implications.  The disincentive would contribute to a “lock-in” effect,
likely growing with each generation. 
Increasing the QFOBI Dollar Limits
With no legislative changes, the effective QFOBI exemption has fallen, due to
the increase in the general estate tax exemption.    The QFOBI dollar limit could be
increased, which would reduce the number of firms that are taxable   The CBO study
provides some estimates of the effects of a general exemption that can also be used
to infer some of the effects of raising the combined QFOBI and general exemption.
In 2000, 485 estates claiming QFOBI paid tax, and 164 of those had insufficient
liquidity to pay the tax.  With a $1 million general exemption, a rise to a $1.5 million
total (allowing a $500,000 QFOBI deduction) would reduce those numbers by about
50% — to 223 and 82 respectively.  Allowing a $2 million total limit (a $1 million
QFOBI) would reduce the numbers by about around two thirds — to 135 and 62
respectively.
Retaining the Estate Tax and Expanding the General
Exemption and/or Lowering Rates
Another option is to retain the estate tax and stepped-up basis, but increase the
general exemption, lower the rates, or both.  This approach is much more costly than
increasing the QFOBI exemption since it would apply to all estates.  But it would
alter the taxation of both business and non-business estates substantially.  In 2000,
52,000 estates owed taxes and 2,834 (5.5%) had insufficient liquid assets to pay the
tax.  At that time the general estate tax exemption was $675,000.  Increasing the
exemption to $1.5 million (the 2005 value), $2 million (the 2006-2008 level), and
$3.5 million (the 2009 level) would reduce the number of taxable estates by 70%,
88% and 93% respectively.  For all levels of exemptions, between 5 and 6% of
taxable estates would not have enough liquid assets to pay the tax.  These results
suggest that most estates are in the lower part of the asset value distribution, and that
large estates have significant liquid assets.  In the case of farmers, the proportional
reduction would be greater: 82%, 92%, and 96% respectively.  The share (although
not the number) of estates that would have insufficient liquidity to pay the tax would
rise from 8% to 9%, 12%, and 20% respectively.  These values suggest that the share
of liquid assets in farm estates becomes smaller as estates become larger. 
In a different study,  the Tax Policy center found that in 2011, with a $1 million
exemption, there would be 760 taxable estates with farm or businesses comprising
more than 50% of assets; with a $2 million exemption there would be only 210, and
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with a $3.5 million exemption only 50.18  These reductions in the tax burden on
business assets are, however, accompanied by even more important general
reductions in estate taxes, so that, if the objective is to provide relief for family
businesses, it is not target efficient. 
Clearly an increase in the general exemption would dramatically reduce the
number of taxable estates with family owned businesses.
A General Exemption for Business Property
An alternative approach to raising the general exemption would be to provide
an exemption for all business property.  With all business property deducted, no
estate would have taxes that required the liquidation of the business.  With a tax rate
of around 50%, about one quarter of the estate would be used to pay taxes if business
assets were 50% of the total.   Since farm and business assets are slightly over 10%
of assets in taxable estates, the cost of this provision would be slightly over 10% of
the cost of repealing the estate tax altogether.
An open-ended business exemption would eliminate the cliff effects of the
current QFOBI, since all estates with any business property would be eligible to
exclude business assets.  But, it would also increase the number of estates that would
claim a special deduction and increase the amount of assets that receive special tax
treatment.  The increase in the number of estates and the amount of assets receiving
favorable tax treatment would also create distorting effects, encouraging
disproportionate investment in business assets across a broad range of estates.   
An open ended deduction would also be much more costly than the current
QFOBI deductions and would much less precisely target family owned businesses.
Recall that about 40% of taxable estates have business or farm assets, but only about
3% have more than half their assets in business assets, and only about 1% qualify for
QFOBI.  In addition to expanding the scope of coverage, estates would receive a
much larger deduction with an unlimited business exemption.
A general business exemption could still have a dollar cap, which would reduce
the cost, relative to an open-ended deduction.  Any type of deduction aimed at certain
assets would still require rules to prevent abuse (such as limits on cash transferred
into the business) and would still create inequities and incentives, although there
would no longer be incentives to overvalue business assets or undervalue other assets
to qualify for the deduction, as in the case of the cliff in QFOBI.     
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An Exemption for Business Property Targeted to
Liquidity
Another option is to target the liquidity issue specifically by establishing a
business exemption based on the availability of non-business assets to pay the tax.
In this case, the business exemption would be a function of both the size of the estate
and the share of the estate that is held in business assets.  This targeted approach
might provide significant revenue savings relative to an exemption that simply
excludes all business assets.  This approach is illustrated using a simplified example
with a flat rate estate tax rate.  (Recall that the federal estate tax before the EGTRRA
2001 changes included graduated rates, and the exemption was actually a credit for
the taxes that would have been due on the amount up to the exemption amount.   The
graduated rates (if retained in a final law), however, would need to be taken into
consideration under the option described here.)   
Congress might wish to consider the policy option of limiting the business
exemption so that the tax is no more than the liquidated value of the non-business
assets.  The reasoning behind this policy objective is readily apparent.  Optimally, the
estate tax should not force a family business (or farm) to liquidate business assets that
generate income, particularly if the business is to continue in the family after the
original owner dies.  In this scenario, the tax on the entire estate should match the
value (at most) of non-business assets.
For example, consider an estate where the total value of all assets in the estate
is $10 million, the regular exemption is $1 million, and assume the tax rate is a flat
55% (a simplified version of the pre-2001 tax law rules).  Further assume that three-
quarters (75%) of the value is held in business assets.   If all business assets were
exempted, there would be an exemption of $8.5 million ($7.5 million for the business
assets and an additional $1 million regular exemption) and the tax due would be
$825,000.  Suppose instead that an exemption is set precisely so that the tax equals
the liquidated value of the all non-business assets (or $2.5 million).  This outcome
requires a total exemption of $5,454,545 ($2.5 million divided by the tax rate of 55%
plus the $1 million regular exemption).  Or, stated differently, the tax on what is left
in the estate after the business exemption and the regular exemption amount must
generate $2.5 million in taxes at the 55% rate.
The estate tax is 55% times ($10,000,000 — $1,000,000 — $4,454,545), or $2.5
million, which is exactly the value of non-business assets.  In this case, the  effective
tax rate is 25% ($2.5 million divided by $10 million).  No business faces a liquidity
problem, there is no cliff, and the revenue cost of the exemption is less than what
would be the case if all business assets were exempt from the estate tax.
In contrast, if exemptions are allowed for all estates, the revenue loss is larger
than necessary to target the liquidity issue.  If estates are excluded based on a fixed
share of business assets (a “cliff” at 50% of total asset value in business assets for
example), as in the QFOBI, the rules create very powerful incentives to shift assets
to business uses to meet the qualification threshold.  This effect will become more
powerful if the exemption is unlimited.  If the rules precisely target the business
assets to deal with the liquidity issue, as described in the previous example, there is
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also an incentive to shift assets into business uses.  In the example provided above,
there is an implicit 100% tax on non-business assets, which also creates a powerful
incentive to shift assets into the business — not as powerful as a cliff effect, but more
powerful than a simple exemption.
For that reason policy makers could opt to modify the formula such that the tax
does not consume the entire value of the non-business assets.  For example, if every
dollar shifted into a business asset increased tax liability by less than a dollar, the
incentive effect to reclassify assets is muted.  The equation below allows a variety of
changes in taxable portion of non-business assets.19  The variable “d” is the portion
of the non-business assets that would be used to pay the tax.  Reducing d, reduces the
estate tax burden on non-business assets.  If policy makers chose to only devote 60%








t is the estate tax rate;
At is the total value of all assets in the estate;
Anb is the total value of non-business/farm assets;
Ab is the total value of business/farm assets in the estate;
Es is standard estate tax exemption amount; and
Eb is the business/farm asset exemption.
Table 3 illustrates the revenue loss associated with these alternatives for three
$10 million estates, assuming a 55% flat rate, and a $1 million general exemption.
Note that the difference between the 55% tax and the unlimited business exemption
is that the business exemption includes the general exemption when it is smaller,
rather than being added to the business exemptions (i.e. each differs by $550,000
which is 55% of $1 million).  This adjustment could be made to a general unlimited
exemption and would reduce the revenue cost significantly.
Adjusting the exemption of business size in this fashion allows revenue savings
for the federal government relative to an unlimited exemption, and eliminates the
cliff effect.  And, although the equations seem complex, this system would simplify
estate planning because qualifying for the exemption would not be as important.
Shifting one dollar from non-business to business use would save the taxpayer less
than one dollar, with the size depending on the share parameter (i.e., if the d
parameter is set at 70%, each dollar shifted saves 70 cents, more than with an
unlimited exemption, where it saves 55 cents).
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Table 3.  Revenue Cost of Options for a $10 Million Estate with a
55% Flat Tax Rate
(revenue cost in $ millions)
Share of Estate in Business Assets in Three
Estates
Share of Non-Business
Assets Paid in Tax, the d
parameter.
Estate I Estate II Estate III
75% 50% 25%
1.00 2.000 0.000 0.000
0.90 2.250 0.500 0.000
0.80 2.500 0.950 0.000
0.70 2.750 1.450 0.000
0.60 3.000 1.950 0.450
0.55 3.125 2.200 0.825
Unlimited Exemption 3.675 2.750 1.375
Source:  Calculations based on equations in the text.  The tax rate is 55%; the estate value is $10
million, the value of the standard exemption is $1 million; share of business assets is set at 25%, 50%,
and 75%) and d ranges from 0.55 to 1.
The graphic below exhibits the effective tax rate on a hypothetical estate
depending on the business share of assets.  If the entire estate is business assets (on
the left side of the graph), there is no tax.  Each line represents a different value for
the policy parameter d.  Recall that the closer d gets to one, the greater the estate tax
burden.

















































Figure 1.  Hypothetical Estate Tax Burden
by Share of Business Assets Under Five
Policy Parameters
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This type of sliding scale means that the fraction of business assets deducted
varies depending on the concentration of  business assets in the estate.  This outcome
may be perceived as unfair; at the same time, the average inequity between those with
significant business assets and those with no business assets or only a small share
would be reduced.
Conclusion
Although the evidence suggests that only a small portion of businesses and
farms are subject to the estate tax, there may still be a concern about the impact on
those particular businesses.
The options discussed for addressing family owned business issues involve
trade-offs between the revenue cost of providing exemptions to a broader group than
necessary to address the issue (including repealing the estate tax in general) and other
issues.  The more targeted the proposal, the more administrative, distorting, and
equity issues arise, but the smaller the revenue cost.  
The QFOBI deduction, which is the most targeted of the options considered in
this paper, created a particularly difficult problem due to its cliff effect, and the final
approach discussed is aimed at eliminating the cliff effect and providing a sliding
scale deduction targeted at liquidity issues.  Of course, if policy makers desire to
eliminate the estate tax as provided in 2010, and there are arguments for doing so, the
liquidity issue would disappear.  But the revenue effect would be significant and the
substitute capital gains provisions would exacerbate lock-in effects.    
Technical Appendix
Algebraically, the equations are the following:
(1) t A E E At s b nb× − − =( )
(2) A A At b nb= +
where,
t is the estate tax rate;
At is the total value of all assets in the estate;
Anb is the total value of non-business/farm assets;
Ab is the total value of business/farm assets in the estate;
Es is standard estate tax exemption amount; and
Eb is the business/farm asset exemption.
The next step in determining the appropriate value of the business exemption,
Eb, is to rearrange equation (1).  The following equation, (1)*, for determining the
appropriate business exemption if the policy objective is to match the estate tax due
to the entire liquidated value of non-business assets.
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Equation (3) below allows a variety of changes in taxable portion of non-
business assets.  The variable “d” is the portion of the non-business assets that would
be used to pay the tax.  In equation (1)*, d =1, or the total value of non-business
assets are used to pay the tax.  Reducing d, reduces the estate tax burden on non-
business assets.  For example, if policy makers chose to only devote 60% of non-
business assets (and 0% of the business assets) to pay the tax, then d=0.60.21
(3) E A E
A d
t
b t s
nb
= − −
